Jiatu Li | How to build cryptography from proof complexity

Jiatu Li | How to build cryptography from proof complexity

🎙 Jiatu Li (MIT) 👥 8K 📅 October 19, 2026 ⏱ 39 min 👁 147 📄 original study 🧭 2026-10-20
Available in: English (current) Français

Keywords

cryptographyproof complexityextended FregeSNARKbounded arithmetic

Summary

The seminar by Jiatu Li presents a new research direction connecting proof complexity and cryptography. The starting point is an open problem in proof complexity: proving super-polynomial lower bounds for the extended Frege system from computational assumptions. The talk then introduces the cryptographic primitive of succinct non-interactive arguments (SNARKs) and explains the difficulty of constructing them without idealised models such as random oracles or strong obfuscation assumptions. The key observation is that the security analysis of a certain SNARK scheme from previous work can be formalised in a very weak bounded arithmetic theory. This formalisation allows the authors to show that if proving extended Frege lower bounds is itself unprovable in the relevant theory, then secure SNARKs can be built. The main theorem states that under assumptions about the unprovability of lower bounds, plus standard cryptographic assumptions, one obtains SNARKs for NP. The proof sketch highlights the importance of formalising cryptographic reductions in weak theories. A follow-up work connects the same ideas to proof complexity generators and the hardness of proving incompressibility. The talk concludes with open questions and implications for the foundations of cryptography.

185 words

Critical Evaluation

Value of the Information & Strength of the Argument

The value of the information is high: it outlines a genuinely novel link between two deep areas of theoretical computer science and presents a concrete theorem with a proof sketch. The argumentation is solid but relies on a rather non-standard assumption (that proving extended Frege lower bounds is itself unprovable in a weak theory), which is non-falsifiable in the usual cryptographic sense. The speaker is careful to define all terms and engages productively with audience questions, clarifying subtle points about the strength of the assumption and the role of the proof system. The reasoning is incremental and builds on prior work (Jain et al.), showing how formalisation in bounded arithmetic is the key step. Overall, the argument is compelling within the formal framework, though the ultimate cryptographic relevance depends on the plausibility of the non-falsifiable assumption.

Scientific Rigor, Source Quality, Title Accuracy

The rigor is high: the talk is given at the Isaac Newton Institute, and the speaker explicitly cites prior work (Ilango 2025, Jain et al. 2021, JKL 2024, Krajíček & Pudlák, Razborov, Kilian & Micali, Sahai & Waters). The formal definitions are precise, and the notation is consistent. The title accurately matches the content, and the slides/blackboard appear well-organised. However, the talk is a research seminar, not a peer-reviewed publication, and some statements are presented as intuitive sketches rather than fully rigorous proofs. The description provides links to the institute and the seminar page, which serve as verifiable references for the event. No inconsistencies or unsupported claims were noticed, aside from the inherent reliance on unproven assumptions typical of research-level talks.

272 words

Title / Content Match

The title accurately reflects the seminar content: the speaker explains how to build cryptographic constructions starting from assumptions about the unprovability of proof complexity lower bounds.

Quality & Reliability

8/10

The talk presents rigorous mathematical definitions and proofs, given by a specialist at a recognized research institution. However, the results are not yet peer-reviewed and the presentation is informal with many audience interruptions.

Key Moments

Cited Sources

Contribution & Novelties

The talk introduces a novel bridge between proof complexity and cryptography, showing that a specific non-falsifiable assumption about the unprovability of extended Frege lower bounds can be used to construct SNARKs for NP. This is a significant conceptual contribution, as it suggests a new route to bypass known barriers in cryptography. The work also demonstrates that complex cryptographic security proofs can be formalised in very weak logical theories, which may have broader implications.

Pour aller plus loin :

132 words

Radar Profile

The radar profile shows very high technical level and information quality, with slightly lower quantitative breadth and reliability scores. This is expected for a specialised research seminar where depth is prioritised over breadth and where assumptions are non-verifiable.

Reliability 8/10